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were	 wasted	 after	 Alyaksandr	 Lukashenka	 came	 to	 power.	 He	 ordered	













rus’s	 distinctiveness	 from	 Russia	 stronger	 than	 before.	 One	 of	 the	 key	
tools	employed	to	implement	this	task	was	the	activation	of	memory	poli­
tics,	which	was	formerly	very	restrained.	To reinforce	the	foundations	of	











































	• One	of	 the	most	 interesting	and	 far­reaching	changes	 in	 the	politics	of	
memory	 after  1991	 concerns	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 significance	 and	 the	
historical	 role	of	 the	Grand	Duchy	of	Lithuania	 (GDL).	A  radical	 transi­
tion	from	absolute	rejection	of	the	GDL,	as	a state	with	which	Belarusians	
have	nothing	 in	common,	 to	recognising	 it	as	one	of	 the	sources	under­
lying	Belarusian	statehood	has	taken	place	during	Lukashenka’s	rule.	It is	
manifested,	 for	example,	 through	 the	prevalence	of	 this	 topic	 in	 school	
textbooks.	Since	the	present	regime	took	over	from	the	historians	repre­

















































































	• The modification	 of	 the	 historical	 narrative	 has	 not	 effected	 the	 exist­
ing	evaluation	of	the	period	when	Belarus	was	part	of	 the	Soviet	Union.	





























































changes	will	 depend	 on	 the	 regime’s	 nature	 and	 its	 potential	 evolution.	
It should	be	emphasised	that	a more	daring	turn	in	the	historical	narrative,	
and	orienting	it	more	towards	national	traditions,	have	inalterably	been	








































































1	 W. Śleszyński,	Historia w służbie polityki. Zmiany polityczne a konstruowanie przekazu historycznego 





































However,	 the	 gradual	 transformation	 of	 the	Belarusian	politics	 of	memory	
seen	 so	 far	 should	not	be	overstated.	The  state	 is	 still	 in	 search	of	 an  inde­






















































































In political	 terms,	 it	 is	used	as	a  justification	 for	 the	process	of	Belarusian­










5	 Z.J.  Winnicki,	 Ideologia państwowa Republiki Białoruś  – teoria i  praktyka projektu,	 Wrocław	 2013,	















































7	 K. Kłysiński,	P. Żochowski,	The end of the myth of a brotherly Belarus? Russian soft power in Belarus 
after 2014: the background and its manifestations,	OSW,	Warsaw	2016,	www.osw.waw.pl.
8	 Z.J. Winnicki,	Ideologia państwowa…,	op. cit.,	pp. 49–50.












































Białorusini. Między Wschodem a Zachodem,	Lublin	2012,	pp. 41–42.
11	 W. Śleszyński,	Historia w służbie polityki…,	op. cit.,	p. 59.
12	 A. Tichomirow,	Michaiła Kojałowicza koncepcja „Rosji Zachodniej” w kontekście relacji rosyjsko ‑polskich 



























15	 See	A.M. Dyner,	M. Rust,	Belarus between the East and the West: Old/New Dilemmas,	College	of	Eastern	
Europe,	Wrocław	2018,	pp. 20–31,	www.kew.org.pl.	The authors	of	 this	report,	published	 in	 Janu­
ary 2019,	define	contemporary	Belarus	as	a ‘state	between’	also	in	civilisational	terms.












II. THE SEARCH FOR ITS OWN WAY.  
ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE HISTORICAL IDENTITY  
(1991–1994)






























formation	and	rejects	any	values	 linked	to	 it,	 such	as	representative	democ­
racy,	the	market	economy,	human	rights	or	private	property.17	For	this	reason,	























together	with	 the	resolution	on	Belarus	 leaving	 the	USSR	of	25 August  1991	
and	 the	proclamation	of	 its	 full	 independence,	 created	a  legal	and	political	
basis	 for	 the	existence	of	an  independent	 state.	The Republic	of	Belarus	 in	
September  1991	already	had	new	symbols	 referring	 to	 the	GDL,	namely	 the	
Pahonia	emblem	and	the	white	­red	­white	flag.	However,	unlike	its	neighbours,	



















21	 S. Owsiannik,	 J. Striełkowa,	Władza a społeczeństwo. Białoruś 1991–1998,	Warszawa	1998,	pp. 19–20.



























































































III. THE PRO‑RUSSIAN DRIFT   
THE IDEOLOGISATION OF THE POLITICS OF MEMORY  
(1994–2014)
In  July  1994,	 the	 first	 presidential	 election	 in	Belarus’s	history	was	won	by	














Another	 equally	 important	 component	of	Lukashenka’s	 election	manifesto	
was the	clear	orientation	toward	economic	and	political	integration	with	the	
Russian	 Federation.	This	was	 justified	not	 only	 economically	 but	 also	 ideo­












27	 В. Карбалевич,	Александр Лукашенко. Политический портрет,	Москва	2010,	pp. 103–108.

































The Soviet	 vision	 of	 history	was	 resumed	 after  1995,	with	 only	 slight	mod­
































































































































































IV. CREATING ELEMENTS OF DISTINCTNESS   
A CAUTIOUS TURN IN MEMORY POLITICS (2014–)





























40	 The issue	of	 intensifying	activity	of	Russian	soft	power	in	Belarus	was	presented	in	detail	 in	2016	
by	OSW.	See	K. Kłysiński,	P. Żochowski,	The end of the myth…,	op. cit.	The activity	of	the	 ‘Russian	
world’	 in	Belarus	after 2016	was	analysed	by	researchers	from	the	International	Strategic	Action	
Network	for	Security	(iSANS)	and	the	 independent	Belarusian	think	tank	EAST.	See	A. Елисеев,	
Кардинальные перемены в  антибелорусской дезинформации и  пропаганде: анализ количествен‑
ных и  качественных изменений,	 EAST	 Center,	 April  2019,	 www.east­center.org;	 Принуждение 

























with	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 develop	 the	 identity	 of	 Belarusians.	 This	
process	 has	 been	 branded,	with	 a  dose	 of	 exaggeration	 and	 definitely	 pre­
maturely,	as	 ‘soft	Belarusisation’.	 It  should	be	noted	 that	 the	 first	efforts	 to	
build	a national	narrative	were	made	before 2014	and	included,	for	example,	






1. The cradle of statehood: the Principality of Polotsk
The history	of	the	Principality	of	Polotsk	as	the	earliest	form	of	Slavic	state­
hood	 in	 the	 territory	 of	modern	­day	 Belarus,	 which	 had	 been	 studied	 for	
centuries	but	was	previously	played	down,	became	one	of	 the	most	 impor­
tant	threads	of	the	new	modified	Belarusian	memory	politics.	To distinguish	


























regardless	of	 the	historical	evidence –	was	the	 fact	 that	 this	heritage	 is	not	
a matter	of	dispute	with	neighbouring	countries,	unlike	 the	history	of	 the	






of	Belarusian	historians	published	in 2016:	Sources of Belarusian statehood: the 
Polotsk and Vitebsk lands from the 9th to the 18th centuries,	tracing	back	the	roots	

























































so  clearly	 the	 founding	myth	 of	Belarus	 (as well	 as	 the	 aforementioned	 at­
tempt	to	change	the	content	of	school	textbooks)	does	not	fit	in	with	the	way	
of	thinking	of	local	Polotsk	authorities	or	the	central	government	in	Minsk.	
One	proof	of	 this	 is	 the	fact	that	 local	museums	have	retained	their	earlier	
narrative,	identical	to	the	Russian	one.49
However,	 the	 inconsistent	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 increasing	 public	 awareness	 of	
the	 importance	of	 the	Principality	of	Polotsk	does	not	mean	 that	 this	 topic	
has	been	abandoned	in	politics	of	memory.	On 19 April 2019,	during	a solemn	






















































to	Polotsk	(!),	 supported	the	 idea	of	establishing	a new	holiday.	 In  turn,	Alyaksandr	Krautsevich,	
PhD,	viewed	this	as	an attempt	to	marginalise	the	Freedom	Day	celebrated	by	independent	circles	

















2. The powerful heritage: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
One	of	the	most	interesting	and	far	­reaching	changes	in	the	politics	of	mem­
ory	of	Minsk	since 1991	concerns	the	revision	of	the	significance	of	the	Grand	






















While	 nationalist	­oriented	 historians	 could	 not	 find	 common	 ground	with	
the	Sovietised	Belarusian	public,	President	Lukashenka,	who	did	not	 share	
their	ideas	at	all,	 in	fact	began	to	voice	the	views	of	his	voters.	At that	time	
he	 was	 openly	 criticising	 the	 GDL,	 largely	 inspired	 by	 his	 former	 history	
teacher,	Yakov	Treshchanka,55	a supporter	of	the	West	Ruthenian	school,	who	
dated	Belarusian	statehood	from	the	establishment	of	the	Byelorussian SSR.	
53	 W. Śleszyński,	Historia w służbie polityki…,	op. cit.,	p. 216.
54	 A.  Krawcewicz,	 ‘Wielkie	 Księstwo	 Litewskie  –	wizja	 litewsko­białoruska?’	 [in:]  A.  Nikžentaitis,	
M. Kopczyński	(eds),	Dialog kultur pamięci w regionie ULB,	Warszawa	2014,	p. 83,	as	in:	ngoteka.pl.
55	 In  1975,	 Lukashenka	graduated	 from	history	department	 (major:	 teacher)	 at	Mogilev	State	Peda­















































57	 As  quoted	 in:	 A.  Dziarnowicz,	 ‘„Poszukiwanie	 ojczyzny”.	 Dyskurs	 na	 temat	Wielkiego	Księstwa	

























































































is	 viewing	 the	 changes	 in	 the	Belarusian	historical	narrative	with	 increas­
ing	concern.	A reflection	of	 this	may	be	 the	 theses	presented	 in	 the	above­
­mentioned	conceptual	article	from	Belaruskaya Dumka.	Its	authors	state	that	





62	 The  celebration	 of	 Thaddeus	 Kościuszko’s	 birthday	 in  2020	 in	Minsk	was	 attended	 by	 the	 Bela­
rusian	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Vladimir	 Makei,	 the	 Polish	 ambassador	 Artur	 Michalski,	
the	 Lithuanian	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Linas	 Linkevičius	 and	 the	 chargé	 d’affaires	 of	 the	





















is	 gaining	momentum	 in	Belarus,	which	produces	 dogmas	 of	mythological	
origin	and	consistently	hammers	them	into	the	heads	of	schoolchildren	and	













of 5.6%),	and	18.2% for	 the	Byelorussian SSR	(an  increase	of  1.2%).	No such	









64	 For	more	detail,	see:	K. Kłysiński,	P. Żochowski,	The end of the myth…,	op. cit.,	pp. 17–18.
65	 M. Самойлов,	 ‘Великое	княжество	Литовское	никогда	не	было	«белорусским	государством»’,	
EurAsia	Daily,	31 December 2019,	www.eadaily.com.


























of	communism	a  large	number	of	 these	objects	have	survived,	 in	most	
cases	in	ruins.	In 2002,	a governmental	programme	was	adopted	to	restore	























































The  intensification	 of	 the	 state	­financed	 initiatives	 linked	 to	 the	 his­
tory	of	the	Grand	Duchy	of	Lithuania	and	the	former	Polish	Republic	is	
a controversial	 issue.	On the	one	hand,	 it	underlines	the	government’s	









69	 For	more	detail,	see:	W. Konończuk,	cooperation	P. Kosiewski,	Endangered heritage. Polish cultural 























3. Moderate scepticism: Belarus in the Russian Empire



















70	 The  name	 ‘Great	 Patriotic	War’	 applied	 to	World	War  II	 in	 the	USSR	 and	 contemporary	Russia,	
with	which	Western	readers	are	more	familiar,	refers	to	the	tradition	of	special	commemoration	









































71	 In  Belarusian	 historical	 narrative,	 this	 view	 has	 been	 expressed	most	 emphatically	 by	 Anatol	
Taras,	the	author	of	numerous	popular	science	books.	See	A. Тарас,	1812 год – трагедия Беларуси,	
Минск 2018.
72	 Вялiкi гiстарычны атлас Беларусi,	т. 3	(collective	work),	Минск	2016,	pp. 37–42.
73	 С.В. Паноу,	С.В. Марозава,	У.А. Сосна,	Гiсторiя Беларусi. Канец XVIII – пачатак XX ст. 8 клас,	
Минск	2018,	pp. 12–20,	www.uchebniki.by.	Although,	as	noted	by	the	journalists	of	the	Nasha Niva	
newspaper,	the	new	edition	of	the	textbook	for	eighth	grades	published	in 2018	(only)	reintroduced	











































































particularly	problematic	 for	 the	new	Belarusian	politics	of	memory.	This	 is	
manifested	 through	 the	rather	cautious	attitude	 towards	 the	 January	Upris­
ing	and	the	figure	of	Konstanty	Kalinowski.	Interestingly,	even	in	the	Soviet	
period,	his	activity	was	viewed	more	positively	than	today.	At that	time,	the	
social	 elements	 of	 his	 political	 agenda	were	 exposed,	 including	 improving	
peasants’	living	standards.	Thus,	he	was	presented	as	someone	who	defended	










anian	 government.	 The  Belarusian	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 refrained	
from	officially	commenting	on	these	events	until	March 2019.	The ministry’s	











































of	 the	uprising	 leaders,	organised	with	great	pomp	by	Lithuania	 in	Vilnius	
on	22 November 2019.	Unlike	Lithuania	and	Poland,	Belarus	did	not	delegate	




























































































































































in	Warsaw’s	Praga	District	 in  1794.	A much	more	balanced	approach	 is	
presented	by	the	Volkovysk	War	and	Historical	Museum	named	after	Pyotr	


















4. A conditional acceptance: the Belarusian People’s Republic













































































were	 applied	 against	 the	 supporters	 of	 the	 illegal	march	 organised	 by	 the	
radical	opposition	in	the	city	centre,	including	preventive	detentions.	In this	
way,	they	wanted	to	clearly	show	that	the	opposition’s	activity	was	possible	





































There	are	many	 signs	 implying	 that	Lukashenka	ultimately	 concluded	 that	
the conditional	 liberalisation	of	the	memory	of	the	BNR	in	spring 2018	was	
too	risky	an experiment,	especially	from	the	point	of 	view	of	the	authoritarian	
regime’s	 stability.	Despite	 the	 growing	 fears	 relating	 to	 the	Kremlin’s	 revi­
sionist	policy	in	the	post	­Soviet	area,	the	president	is	equally	or	even	more	
concerned	 about	 the	 growing	 potential	 of	 independent	 circles,	 which	 he	
believes	is	excessive,	particularly	that	of	the	nationalist	­oriented	opposition.	
In this	way	he	became,	in	a sense,	a hostage	of	his	own	rhetoric.	This	rhetoric	
has	been	based	 for	years	on	negating	 the	national	 idea,	understood	by	him	
88	 K. Kłysiński,	‘The celebration	of	the	100th anniversary	of	the	proclamation	of	the	Belarusian	People’s	
Republic’,	OSW,	28 March 2018,	www.osw.waw.pl.	This	limited	liberalisation	was	aptly	summarised	
in	an  interview	with	 the	Belarusian	 radio	 station	Euroradio	by	 the	Belarusian	MP,	Valery	Vara­


































5. The neo‑Soviet narrative: Belarusian territories  














it	 is	written	 that	 “dozens	of	 thousands	of	Soviet	 soldiers	and	officers	were	
captured	and	destroyed	by	the	Polish	authorities	 through	monstrous	abuse,	
hunger	and	cold”.92
91	 Я.К. Новiк,	Гiсторыя Беларусi. 1917–1945 гг. 10 клас,	Мiнск	2012,	pp. 24–25.










































































agreement	with	Nazi	 Germany.	 The  Ribbentrop	­Molotov	 Pact	 is	 presented	
as	a tactical	decision	that	needed	to	be	made,	and	was	therefore	justified,	as	





17 September	 is	 an  important	date	 in	 the	calendar	of	Belarusian	anniversa­




unification	of	Belarus –	 is	not	(and	everything	 indicates	that	 it	will	not	be)	
a public	holiday,	which	is	another	indication	of	the	government’s	striving	to	





and	Ukrainian	people	 left	 to	 fend	for	themselves	on	Polish	territory	during	
96	 ‘Лукашенко	напомнил	КГБ	о	претензиях	«отдельных	государств»	на	территорию	Белорус­
сии’,	Regnum,	13 November 2014,	www.regnum.ru.
97	 ‘Лукашенко	 про	 «Белсат»:	 Что	 у  нас	 там	 есть,	 какой­то	 «Белсат»?	 Польша	 транслирует	
какие­то	каналы?’,	Белсат TV,	1 March 2019,	www.belsat.eu/ru.


























emphasise	 that	 “the	purpose	 [of	 the	attack]	was	 to	 take	 care	of	 the	people	
















amongst	 other	materials	 creates	 the	 impression	 that	 unfavourable	 percep­







102	 In 2009,	Andrei	Vashkevich	wrote	 in	Arche	 that	 “probably	one	 in	 ten	 [residents]	 in	Belarus	can	














From Lenin to Kościuszko –  













































































who	 proudly	 shows	 off	 his	 ‘Sovietness’.	 The  cautious	 attitude	 towards	 any	













consequences	 for	 Belarusians.103	 This	 is	 accompanied	 by	 an  extensive	 and	
largely	mythologised	story	about	the	guerrilla	movement	operating	in	the	ter­



















anniversary	 in	 the	new	era,	which	differs	 from	 the	Soviet	 reality.107	While	
evaluating	 the	 revolution’s	 significance	 for	 Belarus,	 in  2019	 the	 president	
presented	 the	view	 that	 it	was	precisely	 this	 revolution	 that	made	 it	possi­
ble	for	the	first	time	to	build	statehood	structures	that	created	the	conditions	




















































































of	 imperial	 context,	while	 also	 showing	due	 respect	 for	 the	account	of	 the	
Great	Patriotic	War.111	The fact	that	the	Belarusian	president	has	traditionally	
attended	the	holiday	celebrations	in	Minsk	for	years,	although	it	is	celebrated	




















































































































The return of the critical trend in Belarusian historiography  













































rus;	the	study	BNR – The triumph of the defeated	by	Andrei	Chernyakevich,	
helpful	 in	deepening	 the	knowledge	concerning	 the	role	played	by	 the	
Belarusian	People’s	Republic;	and	The sexual revolution in Soviet Belarus in 
1917–1929	by Alyaksandr	Guzhalovsky.




































of	 the	 same	year,	 the	opening	ceremony	of	 the	memorial	 complex	 in	Maly	
	Trostenets	(located	on	the	outskirts	of	Minsk),	the	site	of	mass	Nazi	crimes	
against	 Jews,	was	 attended	 by	 Lukashenka	 and	 the	 presidents	 of	Germany	
and	Austria,	who	accepted	his	invitation,	as	well	as	other	foreign	delegations	
(including	one	from	Poland).
In  the	 opinion	 of	 Belarusian	 independent	 commentators,	 the	 strikingly	 di­



































































123	 О.  Александров,	 ‘Куропаты	—	 наглая	 ложь	 «свядомых»’,	 Во	 славу	 Родины,	 21 March  2020,	
www.vsr.mil.by.
































Belarusian	 culture	 (T­shirts,	mugs,  etc.).	Moreover,	 since  2016,	Vyshy­
vanka	Day	has	been	celebrated	on	2 July	under	the	government’s	auspices.
A section	of	independent	Belarusian	journalists	stated	that –	in	parallel	
to  expanding	 the	 national	 component	 in	 the	 policy	 of	 remembrance  –	
President	Lukashenka	had	 taken	steps	 to	 increase	 the	 role	of	 the	Bela­
rusian	language,	which	was	called	‘soft	Belarusisation’,	a phrase	popular	
among	journalists.	However,	the	linguistic	situation	in	Belarus	remains	
ambiguous,	 as	 evidenced	by	 the	 data	 on	 the	 share	 of	 the	national	 lan­
guage	 in	 individual	 spheres	 of	 socio	­cultural	 life,	 collected	 as	 part	 of	





126	 See	В.М. Фамiн,	С.В. Паноу,	Н.М. Ганушчанка,	Гicторыя Беларусi другая палова 1940‑х гг. – пача‑
так XXI cт.,	Мiнск	2013.















































































praise	 for	domestic	 state	projects	and	 the	continued	acceptance	of	Russian	






















Another	 characteristic	 topic	 raised	 in	 contemporary	 Belarusian	 politics	 of	
memory	is	the	experiment	of	building	a Belarusian	narrative	about	the	Soviet	
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